This paper studies the cross-country variation of the fiscal stimulus and the exchange rate adjustment propagated by the global crisis of 2008-9, identifying the role of economic structure in accounting for the heterogeneity of response. We find that greater de facto fiscal space prior to the global crisis and lower trade openness were associated with a higher fiscal stimulus/GDP during 2009-2010 (where the de facto fiscal space is the inverse of the average tax-years it would take to repay the public debt). Lowering the 2006 public debt/average tax base from the level of low-income countries (5.94) down to the average level of the Euro minus the Euro-area peripheral countries (1.97), was associated with a larger crisis stimulus in 2009-11 of 2.78 GDP percentage points. Joint estimation of fiscal stimuli and exchange rate depreciations indicates that higher trade openness was associated with a smaller fiscal stimulus and a higher depreciation rate during the crisis. Overall, the results are in line with the predictions of the neoKeynesian open-economy model.
Introduction
The global crisis of 2008-9 focused attention on the role of fiscal policy at times of collapsing aggregate demand. Concerns about experiencing a reincarnation of the great depression induced the OECD (high-income group) and emerging market countries to invoke extraordinary policies for extraordinary times. Countries adopted sizable fiscal stimuli, augmented by unprecedented monetary expansions supported by elastic swap lines between the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, and between the Fed and 4 emerging markets.
The flight to quality and the shortage of dollar liquidity posed a special challenge for Emerging
Markets, inducing them to supplement these policies with both large sales of foreign currencies at the height of the crisis and with sizeable depreciations.
[ Table 1 ]
Yet, there has been a remarkable heterogeneity in the magnitudes of the fiscal stimuli, and of the exchange rate depreciation. The differential patterns of response are traced in Table 1, summarizing the fiscal stimulus/GDP and the depreciation rate in 32 countries, chosen by data availability. The first three columns overview the crisis related fiscal stimulus /GDP, 2009 /GDP, -2011 in OECD countries and emerging markets. The crisis led to a significant fiscal stimulus in the U.S., Japan, and Germany, the magnitude of which increased from 2009 to 2010, reflecting various lags associated with fiscal policy. The fourth and the fifth columns report the massive "bailout" transfers to the banking system in the U.S., Germany and the UK, attempting to stabilize the financial panic. It is noteworthy that the size of the transfers to the financial system exceeded the direct fiscal stimuli in Germany and the UK. Similar trends, though in varying intensity, were observed in other OECD countries.
China, South Korea and Russia provided front loaded fiscal stimulus at rates that were well above that observed in most OECD countries. Notable is the greater agility of the emerging markets' response relative to that of the OECD countries, reflecting possibly faster policy response capacity of several emerging markets. The deeper safety net of the OECD [unemployment insurance, food stamps, social security, socialized medical care, etc.] provides automatic stabilizers that work to cushion the economy in addition to the crisis related stimulus. Dolls et al. (2010) reported, "We find that automatic stabilizers absorb 38 per cent of a proportional income shock in the EU, compared to 32 per cent in the U.S. In the case of an unemployment shock 47 percent of the shock are absorbed in the EU, compared to 34 per cent in the U.S. This cushioning of disposable income leads to a demand stabilization of up to 30 per cent in the EU and up to 20 per cent in the U.S. There is large heterogeneity within the EU.
Automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern Europe are much lower than in Central and
Northern European countries." In contrast, emerging markets with a more limited safety net but with larger fiscal space tend to benefit by a more aggressive crisis related fiscal stimulus, compensating partially for the absence of deeper social insurance.
In this paper we study the response heterogeneity of countries during the crisis, indentifying the associations of economic structure [trade openness, fiscal capacity, etc.], the size of fiscal stimuli and the exchange rate depreciations during the crisis. A useful theoretical anchor predicting such heterogeneity is the neo-Keynesian open-economy, as predicted by the Meade's (1951a, b) framework. The textbook Meade model implies that at times of collapsing aggregate demand, economies that are more closed [or less open] should opt for a larger fiscal stimulus and should opt for larger fiscal stimuli, and should rely less on exchange rate depreciation [e.g., Blanchard (2008) ].
1
Trade openness implies lower fiscal multipliers, as a share of the stimuli would 'leak.' Trade openness may also increase the relative potency of exchange rate depreciation (relative to the fiscal stimulus) in mitigating the drop in demand for exportable goods, acting as a demand switching policy, whereby the improved competitiveness of a country increases the demand for net exports.
2
Fiscal policy is predicated on fiscal space and fiscal capacities. While the notion of fiscal space is fuzzy, it deals with the degree to which a country has the ability to fund a fiscal stimulus without a sizable increase in the real interest rate. 3 The presumption is that public debt overhang
[like higher public debt/GDP] reduces the ability to fund fiscal stimuli. Indeed, public debt/GDP has been frequently used by the literature and by policy makers as an important indicator for the soundness of policies, and as a measure of exposure to confidence crises. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) warned that debt-to-GDP ratios over 90 percent are associated with lower growth. 4 Similarly, the Maastricht criteria imposed thresholds of public debt/GDP below 60 percent, and fiscal deficit/GDP below 3 percent as criteria for joining the Euro.
While these ratios are easy to track, we question the degree to which the normalization of public debt and fiscal deficit by the GDP is an efficient way of comparing and measuring fiscal capacities across countries and across time. A given ratio of the public debt/GDP, say 60 percent, is consistent with ample fiscal space in countries where the average tax collection is about or above 50 percent of the GDP, as is the case in France, Germany and in most northern
European countries. The same public debt ratio is associated with a limited fiscal space in countries where the average tax collection is about or below 25 percent, as has been the case in developing countries, emerging markets, and the South-Western Euro Area Peripheral (SWEAP) countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) . Instead of a normalization of public debt and fiscal deficit by the GDP, we contend that the tax revenue as a share of the GDP, averaged across the business cycle, provides a more efficient way of normalizing macro public finance data.
Specifically, we point out that the tax collection/GDP, averaged to smooth for business cycle fluctuations, provides key information on the availability of the tax revenue to support fiscal policy. We define this ratio as the (de facto) tax base: short of a drastic change in tax rates and tax enforcement, the tax base provides a concise summary of the tax capability. The (de facto) tax base reflects both the ability and the willingness of a country to fund fiscal expenditure and transfers. Across countries, we find that the de facto tax base is more stable than public debt/GDP, and public debt/GDP normalized by the de facto tax base is more volatile than public debt/GDP [see the coefficient of variations reported at the bottom of Table 3 ]. The public debt/GDP normalized by the de facto tax base is subject to greater cross country variation, and provides a more robust explanation for the scale of fiscal stimuli. Essentially, the public debt/GDP normalized by the de facto tax base measures the average tax years that it would take to 'buy' the outstanding public debt, and provides a stock measure of public debt overhang. We view this measure as a more fundamental metric for fiscal space, as it links the public debt to the resources the public sector can mobilize without drastic change of the social contract.
Consequently, we define the de facto fiscal space by the inverse of the average tax-years it would take to repay the public debt.
It is noteworthy that if changing government expenditure and taxes are equally costly, our focus on de-facto fiscal space would be questionable. For example, a high level of tax revenue could be interpreted as leaving little room to raise taxes, thus counting negatively toward fiscal space, unlike our interpretation. Our presumption is that the costs of changing the tax rates and their enforcement are high relative to the lower political costs of changing the public debt/GDP and the fiscal deficit/GDP. Thus, the tax base depends on structural factors that are harder to modify in the short run than adjusting government expenditure. This view is consistent with recent empirical literature finding that tax compliance and individual's willingness to pay taxes is affected by perceptions about the fairness of the tax structure. An individual taxpayer is influenced strongly by his perception of the behavior of other taxpayers [see Alm and Torgler (2006) and the references therein]. If taxpayers perceive that their preferences are adequately represented and they are supplied with public goods, their identification with the state increases, and thus the willingness to pay taxes rises [Frey and Torgler (2007) ]. In a follow up work , we studied the relationship between the tax base and income inequality. We found that the GINI coefficient is negatively associated with the size of the tax base/GDP. This implies that changing taxes may be difficult in polarized countries. While all these factors are endogenous in the long-run, they are mostly pre-determined in the short run, the time that the policy maker determines in an unanticipated recession the implementation of fiscal stimuli. In a companion paper, we also study the usefulness of the de facto fiscal space measures by showing that they account better for sovereign spreads of countries than the more conventional public debt/GDP [Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2011) ].
5
We use the pre-crisis de facto fiscal space and structural controls to account for the patterns of fiscal stimuli and exchange rate adjustments during the crisis, validating the predictions of the MF approach. We find that higher public debt/average tax base is associated with lower fiscal stimulus, and greater trade openness is robustly associated with a lower fiscal stimulus and a higher depreciation rate during the crisis. A one standard deviation increase of the public debt/average tax base lowers the size of the fiscal stimulus by about 2 percent of the GDP. A one standard deviation increase of trade openness increases the nominal depreciation Section 2 reviews the heterogeneity of the fiscal stimulus and of the exchange rate adjustment during the crisis window. We also investigate the patterns of de-facto fiscal capacities in 123 countries, a sample chosen by data availability. Section 3 overviews selectively 5 Note also that a country's fiscal space is not independent of the assumptions about growth and the real rate of interest, themselves possibly endogenous with respect to taxes and spending. These factors should play a more pertinent role in explaining the long-run patterns of government spending and growth, and are overlooked by our study as we focus on the fiscal stimuli in the first two years following the events of 2007-8. the literature on fiscal multipliers. Section 4 applies the pre-crisis de facto fiscal space measures and other controls in a regression framework, accounting for the heterogeneity of the fiscal stimuli and of the exchange rate adjustments during the crisis. We also describe in this section the relevance of the de facto fiscal space in explaining sovereign spreads. Section 5 concludes.
Assessment of the de facto fiscal space prior to the crisis (2006)
Insight regarding fiscal space is provided by tracing the pre-crisis 2006 public debt/GDP, as a fraction of the pre-crisis average tax revenue/GDP during 2000-2005. To recall, the early 2000s were viewed as the continuation of the blissful "Great Moderation" -a period characterized by a drop in macroeconomic volatility and risk premium during the late 1990s and early 2000s. 6 The pre-crisis average tax revenue/GDP measures the de facto tax capacity in years of relative tranquility.
[Figure 1]
The top half of Figure 1 reports the average tax-years needed to repay the public debt measure of 123 countries, subject to data availability in 2006. We obtain this measure by Figure 1 is consistent with the notion that, even without increasing the tax base, a fair share of countries had significant fiscal space in 2006. 7 The presumption is that a lower precrisis public debt/GDP relative to the pre-crisis tax base (i.e., higher de-facto fiscal space)
implies greater willingness to fund fiscal stimuli using the existing tax capacity. We apply these concepts in order to explain the cross-country variation in the fiscal stimulus during the aftermath of the global crisis.
[Figure 2]
To track the adjustment of fiscal capacity across countries, the top half of Figure 2 also reports our main fiscal space measure, the debt/GDP normalized by the average tax revenue/GDP, by country groups. Lower pre-crisis public debt/GDP, lower public debt/average tax base, and lower fiscal deficits relative to the average tax base imply greater fiscal capacity.
The figure shows that fiscal space was weakest (highest levels of public debt/average tax base) in the low and middle-income countries. Although fiscal space measures are stronger in the SWEAP countries than in low-and middle-income countries, its debt/GDP ratio is higher.
Generally, the SWEAP countries had more limited fiscal space during the tranquil period than other OECD countries -higher average public debt relative to the tax base, and a higher level of public debt to GDP. The lower panel of Figure [ Table 2 ]
We conduct first a descriptive analysis of the between-period stability for the key variables in Table 2 . Specifically, we are interested in the relative stickiness of the average tax/GDP, public debt/GDP, and the public debt/average tax base between the 1993-99 and the 2000-2006 periods, within each country in the sample. To have a representative comparison, we do this exercise for countries with at least three years of observations in both periods; this leaves us with 80 countries. We calculate the mean of these variables for each period, perform a t-test for each country, and report the significant (5 percent) results by country groups as well as the total. The total number of countries with a significant change of the average tax base/GDP over the decades is 66, slightly larger than the number of countries with a significant change of public debt/GDP, 58. A majority of countries sees a drop of average tax base/GDP (34 decline versus 29 increase), while the number of increases and decreases of the public debt/GDP are not as markedly different. In total, within country over the decade, the public debt/average tax base is more volatile than the public debt/GDP.
[ Table 3 ] Table 3 provides the mean, standard deviation, median, and coefficient of variation for the same sample of 80 countries. The mean tax base is 24 percent of GDP, while the mean public debt is 60 percent of GDP. The mean public debt is 300 percent of the average tax base (3 tax years).
The cross-country coefficient of variation confirms that the public debt/average tax base is subject to a sizably greater variation than the public debt/GDP (0.74 versus 0.56).
Fiscal multipliers in the Open Economy -literature overview
Before turning to the regression analysis, we place the paper in the context of the evolving literature on fiscal policy at times of distress. Textbook analysis of fiscal stimulus in a closed economy suggests that an increase in government expenditure on goods and services in a closed economy would deliver a greater beneficial stimulus if -It would not crowd out private sector activities, -It would not increase interest rates, and would not raise concerns about the future fiscal and monetary stability of the country.
-It would target projects with high social marginal product, and would take place before the onset of the recovery, contributing thereby towards shortening the recession. These considerations suggest that during the crisis of 2008-9, closer economies, or countries with greater fiscal space would opt for a larger fiscal stimulus. Opener countries or countries with more limited fiscal space would opt for a smaller fiscal stimulus and larger exchange rate depreciation. We turn now to empirical tests of these and related hypotheses. We test the degree to which the cross country variation in actual fiscal stimuli confirms the predictions of the MF framework.
Fiscal space, exchange rate adjustment, and fiscal stimuli
We apply both public debt/GDP and public debt/GDP normalized by the average tax base concepts in order to explain the cross-country variation in the fiscal stimulus during the aftermath of the global crisis. Recall that Figure 2 suggests that in 2006, the middle-income countries' fiscal space was higher than that of the low-income countries. While the pre-crisis debt overhangs [i.e., the 2006 public debt/GDP] of the low and lower middle income countries were slightly above the other groups, their ratios the public debt/GDP to the average tax base were much higher than that of most the OECD countries [5.94, 3.70 and about 1.5, respectively].
This in turn implies that the low and middle-income countries have had smaller fiscal space than most OPEC countries. Consequently, the fiscal stimuli of the richer countries would have the side benefit of helping the poorer countries in invigorating the demands facing lower income countries.
[ Table 4 ]
Based on data availability of 123 countries, we present in Table 4 the regression analysis, accounting for the cross-country variation in the fiscal stimulus during 2009-11. The explanatory variables are the public debt/GDP and the de facto fiscal space. We begin with these two explanatory variables in the simple OLS estimation in columns (1) and (2). The OLS results
show that neither public debt/GDP nor public debt normalized by the average tax base can explain the size of fiscal stimuli. Since there are only 30 or so countries that have a non-zero fiscal stimulus, the OLS method may not be appropriate.
Next we conduct the Tobit estimation (left censoring at zero fiscal stimulus). To account for a potential correlation among countries in each income group, the cross-section estimation is done by clustering at an income group levels (according to the World Bank's income classification). The results in columns (3) and (4), Table 4 , indicate that a higher public debt/average tax base is negatively and significantly associated with the size of the fiscal stimuli, whereas the public debt/GDP is not. Lowering the 2006 public debt/average tax base from the average level of low-income countries (5.94) down to the average level of the Euro -SWEAP countries (1.97) increases the crisis stimulus in 2009-11 by 2.78 GDP percentage points.
However, studying the size of the pledged financial sector bailouts relative to GDP, we find that public debt/GDP (and not public debt/tax base) is positively and significantly associated with the size of financial bailouts. While the sign of the coefficient estimates is sensible for the public debt/tax base, and counter-intuitive for the public debt/GDP, the baseline regression can be improved by dealing with omitted variable biases, and with concerns that the public debt/tax base and the public debt/GDP are endogenous to other variables.
[ Table 5 ] Table 5 explains the size of fiscal stimuli using a larger set of variables. To account for the political capacity and for the role of fiscal policy in the open economy, columns (9) and (10) report the Tobit estimation with the state fragility variable 8 and trade openness/GDP. The effects of the public debt/average tax base and the public debt/GDP are similar to those in Table 4 . In addition, the size of the fiscal stimuli is negatively and significantly associated with the state fragility and trade openness/GDP. That is, stronger states and closer economies have applied a larger fiscal stimulus during 2009-11.
Columns (13) and (15) report regression results where public the debt/average tax base and public debt/GDP are instrumented by lagged economic fundamentals. These fundamentals are trade openness, financial openness, real GDP per capita, growth rate of total real GDP, government share of real GDP per capita, and the legal origins. 9 For example, in equation 15, the public debt/average tax base (Debt %Tax) is the endogenous regressor, instrumented by variables in equation 16. These regressions also have a decent explanatory power, accounting for about 23 percent of the variations across countries in the public debt/GDP, and about 38 percent in the public debt/tax base. The coefficient of the instrumented public debt/GDP in (13) has a negative sign, so does the coefficient of the instrumented public debt/tax base. Both the public debt/tax base and the public debt/GDP are statistically significant at 1 percent level.
The bottom half of Table 5 reports regressions studying jointly the size of fiscal stimuli and the size of financial bailouts. To account for a possible sample selection bias, we first run the probit estimation of the fiscal stimulus on the instrumented public debt/GDP, on state fragility, and on trade openness, column (17), and similarly for the financial bailout in column (18). Then we estimate the seemingly unrelated regression of fiscal stimuli and financial bailout as dependent variables [columns (19) and (22)]. The results indicate that, when both variables are explained jointly, the size of fiscal stimuli can be explained by either the public debt/GDP or the public debt/tax base. Yet, the financial bailouts are not explained well by these variables.
[Figure 4]
We can now provide the economic significance of the public debt/GDP and the public debt/tax base in the cross-country estimates, regressions (19) and (22) groups, as shown in Figure 5 , it is less clear whether the fiscal stimulus and the realized exchange rate adjustments are substitutes or complements.
[ Table 6 .A]
Since the fiscal stimuli and the exchange rate adjustments may be determined by some common factors, it is important to study them jointly. [ Table 6 .B]
[ Table 6 .C]
We conduct a number of robustness checks in Tables 6.B and 6.C. We run a horserace between our fiscal space measure -debt/tax and the conventional measure -debt/GDP in columns (27) and (28) of Table 6 .B. The results show that debt/tax has a stronger effect on the size of fiscal stimulus than debt/GDP. Next, in columns (29) and (30) we run two separate regressions for years 2009 and 2010 and find supportive evidence to our main results. In order to control for the fact that some countries were hit harder than others, we add trade and financial exposure to the US, and terms of trade and unemployment to the estimation. This is done in Table 6 .C columns (32) and (34) --we find that the effect of fiscal space is robust to these controls. To account for the issues of borrowing in foreign currency, we add External Debt/GDP to the estimation of Table 6 .C in columns (31)-(34). Controlling for external debt, we continue to find the effect of fiscal space on the size of fiscal stimulus. In addition, we also find that higher trade exposure (as measured by the export to the US/GDP) and terms of trade deterioration are associated with larger depreciation. We also check whether our findings depend on whether we use trade weighted exchange rate depreciations or dollar based ones. This is done in Table 6 .C columns (33) and (34) --using the trade weighted exchange rate depreciations, subject to data availability, we still find consistently the associations between openness, fiscal space, and the size of fiscal stimulus.
[ Figure 6 ] Figure 6 provides the economic significance of the cross-country estimates in regressions (23 , Table 6 .A) and (25 , Table 6 [ Table 7 ]
Finally, Table 7 illustrates the key importance of the de facto fiscal space (i.e., the public debt/GDP normalized by the tax base) in explaining the dynamics of CDS spreads and SWEAP pricing differentials. Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2011) estimates the dynamics and structure of CDS pricing over the 2003-10 sample period, the dependent variables are sovereign CDS spreads of 3-, 5-and 10-year maturities. 10 This is done in a dynamic panel regression:
where y is the CDS spread; i stands for country and t for year; x is a vector of controls. Our objectives are three-fold. We determine whether CDS spreads are related to fiscal space measures in a panel regression setting; whether there is an identifiable dynamic pattern to CDS spreads during the crisis period; and we investigate pricing differentials of CDS spreads in the Euro and the SWEAP countries, compared to other countries. We seek to answer whether SWEAP CDS spreads follow the same pattern as the rest of the world, and the degree to which they were "mispriced," especially during the 2010 European debt crisis. 
Concluding remarks
We show the importance of pre-crisis fiscal space in accounting for the fiscal stimulus during 2009-11. We also find that higher trade openness had been associated with a smaller fiscal stimulus, and with greater exchange rate depreciation. Economically, these effects are large: a one standard deviation increase of the public debt/average tax base lowers the size of the fiscal stimulus by 2 percent of GDP. A one standard deviation increase of trade/GDP increases the extent of nominal depreciation by about 7 percentage points. A possible interpretation is that a higher public debt/average tax base reduces the supply elasticity of funds facing the treasury, thereby reducing the viability of a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. As fiscal multipliers tend to be lower in more open countries, these countries opted for a smaller fiscal stimulus, putting greater weight on adjustment via exchange rate depreciation ('exporting their way to prosperity').
Overall, these results are consistent with the Neo-Keynesian open economy framework, and with the importance of fiscal space in measuring the viability of countercyclical policies. (1) We categorize countries into 3 groups. For the first group (59 countries), their exchange rates did appreciate from Jan. -Dec. 2010 in the range of [-21.4,0.0] percent. For the second and third groups (27 and 26 countries), the exchange rates depreciated cumulatively in the range of [.3,6.7] This figure reports the economic effects due to a one standard deviation increase of debt/GDP (eq.23), debt/tax base (eq.25), trade openness/GDP (average of eqs.23,25), inflation (average of eqs.23,25), and foreign reserves/GDP (average of eqs.23,25). 
